to 1874, Nietzsche denies that there are Platonic Forms at all, and instead explains the genesis of the notion in terms reminiscent of Kant's transcendental idealist explanation of the genesis of the appearance of biological form in the third Critique.
Schopenhauer had explained the appearance of intelligent design in the structure and functioning of organisms by appealing to the notion of Platonic Forms which somehow serve as organisms' templates. As with mathematical Platonism, ontological inflation inspires epistemological mystery: Schopenhauer must assume that besides the various mental faculties he had already discussed in Book One of the World as Will and Representation, vol. 1, there is also a faculty for intuiting Platonic Forms. Having posited this faculty, Schopenhauer goes on to argue that this also explains our capacity to appreciate the plastic arts.
3 Beautiful works are beautiful because they participate in the Forms, and we come to know this through intuiting the Forms in them. Thus the truth of a judgment of taste, for Schopenhauer, rests on the correspondence of the judgment to aesthetic properties the art object itself possesses--it is an objectivist theory of taste.
But is this the basis for Nietzsche's notion of the Apollinian? It cannot be if we interpret the notes of 1867-68, Birth of Tragedy in 1872 and Truth and Lie in 1873 as all of a piece, for throughout this period, Nietzsche rejects the idea of Platonic Forms. 4 In 1868, we find Nietzsche claiming that the "organism [does] not belong to the thing in itself. The organism is form. If we abstract away the form, it is a multiplicity . . .
3 For Schopenhauer's aesthetics of the plastic arts, see WWR I, pp. 169-255. 4 There are other compelling reasons for seeing the texts from 1868 to 1873 as of a piece. In 1868, Nietzsche argues in one set of notes that Schopenhauer's argument for identifying the Kantian thing-initself with the will is invalid, and that the Kantian position, that things-in-themselves are unknowable, is more nearly correct. Nietzsche also argues against the knowability of things- claiming that our failure to grasp the mind-dependence of organic form makes us hypostatize this form and fantasize that it could exist independent of our minds and the organic phenomena they produce. This fantasy we then baptize with the term "Platonic Form."
The concept "leaf" is formed by arbitrarily discarding these individual differences and by forgetting the distinguishing aspects. This awakens the idea that, in addition to the leaves, there exists in nature the "leaf": the original model according to which all the leaves were perhaps woven, sketched, measured, colored, curled and painted--but by incompetent hands, so that no specimen has turned out to be a correct, trustworthy, and faithful likeness of the original model . experience and well-formed, meaningful judgments about it. But having this structure is a necessary condition of the possibility of experience. All experiencers who confront the objects in question, by virtue of being experiencers, will feel pleasure. This is because those who would be justified in dissenting would be only non-experiencers, and there cannot be dissenting non-experiencers. Therefore the judgment "this object, by virtue of its apparent design, necessarily produces pleasure in experiencers" is intersubjectively valid. And this is all that saying "this object is beautiful" comes to for Kant. Of course, this account of intersubjective validity depends crucially upon his account in the first
Critique of the cognition of empirical objects.
Kant speaks of a "free play" between the understanding and the imagination, a "harmony of the faculties," which gives rise to this aesthetic pleasure. This relationship resembles, but is significantly different from, the one that obtains when the understanding legislates to the imagination in ordinary human experience [CJ, Ak. V, p. 287]. We could say that aesthetic experience is analogous to a process of what Kant calls "recognition" gone wrong [CPR, [103] [104] [105] [106] [107] [108] [109] [110] . Each faculty is doing its job, but when it comes time to plug in the relevant expressions to complete the representation of the object, these expressions are missing. It is as if they were "on the tip of one's tongue." This does not mean that categorical elements or empirical concepts are entirely absent, but that they are unable to play their normal role in generating complete experiences and thoughts. The process of experience-generation culminates in a penultimate stage in which the object is ready to be "recognized" and subsumed under some class. In ordinary cases, this happens readily enough, and the result is a "determinative judgment" about the object. In the aesthetic case, however, no class concept is readily available to subsume the object under.
Metaphorically speaking, the mind scans the object, in response to intimations of patternedness in it, seeking its unifying design. This design, once grasped, should yield the concept under which the object is to be subsumed. But this attempt fails, with the consequence that judgment cannot be made. If that were all, then a faculty would have failed to discharge its function, and the result would be pain, not pleasure. However, the persistent intimation of unifying design, however elusive, holds the faculty of judgment in suspense, preventing it from abandoning the object as an uninterpretable chaos [CJ,
Ak. V, pp. 220-21, 279]. Rather, the faculty of judgment reflects on its own state and judges that it can't help but feel that there is a unifying design to the object. 5 This judgment may very well be true, even if the mystery of the object persists. But in having produced the reflective judgment, the faculty of judgment has discharged its function of producing judgments, and thus in satisfying its aim, produces a feeling of pleasure [CJ,
Ak. V, p. 218]. As in Kant's theories generally, this "processing" takes place off stage, unconsciously. What we as experiencers are conscious of is finding an object beautiful 5 This interpretation suggests that aesthetic experience happens by accident in cognitive contexts. But are we more likely to have an aesthetic experience after a day of frustration at the laboratory than when we are in the museum? While I do think that aesthetic experiences can take us by surprise in this way, another way to bring about aesthetic experience would be to take recognition "offline" by a gentle act of will. Refusal to recognize could be Kant's version of what it is to adopt an aesthetic stance toward an object. Similarly, institutional settings like museums may be aesthetic settings, not by social fiat (as the post-Dadaist "institutional theory of art" would have it) but rather because these institutions uphold certain norms, perhaps including the norm "no 'recognizing in a concept' encouraged here."
and judging that this is so. Kant means by this "pleasure not due to preference-satisfaction," a notion he then uses to secure the intersubjective validity of judgments of taste. Schopenhauer thinks he has no need to shore up the epistemological credentials of aesthetic judgments. Kant, however, would have found his reliance on Platonic Forms and our intuition of them entirely objectionable. Misunderstanding Kant, Schopenhhauer then transforms the notion of disinterested pleasure into the notion of "quieting of the will," as if the plastic arts invariably had an anaesthetic effect. Nietzsche transparently opposes this claim about the arts. Though Nietzsche uses Kantian and Schopenhauerian formulae interchangeably here, his concern is with the epistemological credentials of an aesthetic judgment. This is a problem, given the idiosyncrasy of experience that lyric poetry expresses.
Nietzsche's conception of the Dionysian is inspired by Schopenhauer's explanation of the aesthetic effect of music in terms of its relation to the will as thing-in-itself. Yet
Nietzsche is as skeptical of Schopenhauer's identification of the thing-in-itself with the will from the late 1860s to the mid-1870s as he is of the notion of Platonic Forms. This suggests that the key to the Dionysian, and hence the tragic, may lie, not with
Schopenhauer's analysis of music, but with Kant's analysis of dynamical sublime.
For Schopenhauer, representations of tragic episodes reveal humanity's basic condition, given the nature of the will and the destructive and pointless way that it expresses itself. 8 Tragedy, then, simply shows us the empirical facts about the impossibility of attaining ordinary happiness. This induces in us resigned weariness anticipating the "denial of the will" upon which salvation depends.
Here, we must be quite careful, however, to note the limited role Schopenhauer's metaphysics plays in his account of tragedy. Schopenhauer classes tragedy as a type of poetry, one among many plastic arts. He ascribes its effects to its presentation of the Platonic Form of human nature. The theory of the will only explains why human life is disappointing. The aesthetic effects of tragedy depend not, as in music, on some aesthetic mechanism essentially involving the metaphysics of the will. Instead, tragedy reports the simple fact that we suffer, and the more contentious claim that there is no way around this. The metaphysics of the will serves to explain why human beings suffer, but not why we take pleasure in tragedy. is an experience in which we are exposed to events and images which would be dangerous if real. The effect of pleasure is due, in the first instance, to the presence of the artistic frame, which neutralizes the danger. In Nietzsche's account of the tragic, there must also be an artistic frame. This is why the tragic involves the Apollinian as the representational form that the Dionysian experience must take. The Dionysian must be presented as a human character of beautiful form and also as the circumstances destroying her. This artistic frame of formal representation transforms staged events from dangers to objects of contemplation.
Furthermore, the dynamical sublime, like all aesthetic experiences for Kant, is ultimately pleasurable. Kant's explanation for the peculiarly stern but thrilling quality of that pleasure was that hostile images which leave us unharmed put us into a state analogous to the state we are in when reason overcomes moral temptation. This in turn reminds us that as moral agents, we are not merely vulnerable phenomenal beings, but that we are also, as noumenal beings, ultimately indestructible. This is because the moral law demands the practical conclusion that we are free, and this is only possible if we are also noumenal. Thus scenes of destruction, paradoxically, evoke our own invulnerability.
Kant himself does not go beyond associating the dynamical sublime with our experience of nature, with its "bold, overhanging and, as it were, threatening rocks, The passage from the dynamical sublime to the Nietzschean tragic, however, must take us through several intermediate stages.
First, human activities must be substituted for natural forces. It is no coincidence that so much of the plot material of tragic drama involves war and its side-effects. It is in organized destructiveness that human beings most closely approximate the destructiveness of nature. Second, the neutralized danger the spectator feels must be displaced onto a represented figure--the tragic protagonist. Instead of framed images that, if real, would endanger the spectator, as with painted thunderstorms, the spectator identifies with the protagonist, who, within the frame, absorbs all the danger.
Displacement now does the work of neutralizing the danger, but the tension between danger and its neutralization is itself intensified, as the spectator has a proxy inside the frame. Third, the protagonist must be synthesized by the spectator as a beautiful form;
this is the Apollinian element that Nietzsche claims is essential to tragedy. It is here that
Nietzsche's theory is in debt to Schopenhauer's remarks about tragedy presenting the Platonic Form of Humanity. We need not suppose that the experience involves intuiting Forms, any more than dreaming, to which Nietzsche often likens the Apollinian, involves contact with a dream world. The experience of the protagonist as satisfying to our taste, on a Kantian analysis, does not require any such ontological inflation.
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Naturally, our response to the destructiveness of the tragic cannot be precisely modeled on the account Kant gives of the dynamical sublime. There appears to be nothing in Nietzsche's theory corresponding to the role Kant gives to practical reason. In Kant's account, the combination of an image of danger, with the frame which neutralizes the danger, produces a state in us analogous to the overcoming of moral temptation. This reminds us that we are not only phenomenal but (because we are potentially moral), we are also noumenal beings, invulnerable to the vicissitudes of phenomenal life. 10 Nietzsche often seems to think that a tragedy is more satisfying if the beautiful form and the destructive force are the same character, as in, e.g., Oedipus Rex. However the locus of destruction can be partially displaced away from the beautiful form, as it is in Othello. Othello's destructiveness is dependent upon the destructiveness of Iago. In Richard III, our response to the protagonist approximates pure revulsion, while the beautiful forms, if any, must be sought in his eloquence or his victims. As this last suggestion regarding eloquence makes clear, the notion of form here is potentially a quite broad one.
There is, however, an implied ethic in Birth of Tragedy:
If we conceive of it at all as imperative and mandatory, this apotheosis of individuation knows but one law--the individual, i.e., the delimiting of the boundaries of the individual, measure in the Hellenic sense. Apollo, as ethical deity, exacts measure of his disciples, and, to be able to maintain it, he requires self-knowledge. And so, side by side with the aesthetic necessity for beauty, there occur the demands "know thyself" and "nothing in excess"; consequently overweening pride and excess are regarded as the truly hostile demons of the non- Of course, such an ethics may still seem entirely unsatisfactory from a modern perspective. It would have to trace any requirements not to harm others to a prior requirement to self-restraint merely for the sake of giving the self a certain structure. We may not find such a view acceptable. Nietzsche is in good company, however, since this is also Plato's derivation of the prohibition against interpersonal harm in the Republic.
standards. Kant himself speaks of intersubjectively valid standards as creating a community of feeling, a sensus communis, which parallels or anticipates the standards of a moral community. Rather than reinforcing reason's determinative moral standards, reflective judgments about the design of an agent's character, based on the pleasure this design gives to impartial spectators, would replace determinative judgments of practical reason. Conduct would be judged by its attractiveness, rather than by its conformity to objective rules.
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However that may be, it is clear from the passage above that this activity of giving form to one's own character involves imposing constraints on one's desires. This, in turn, is sufficient to give Nietzsche access to a conception of the dynamical sublime resembling Kant's, up to a point. When confronted with images of danger, our faculty of desire is initially mobilized to flee in terror, but for the aesthetic frame that neutralizes the danger and assures us of our safety. This feeling of standing fast against temptation produces an aesthetic state paralleling what we experience when we give form to our conduct in accord with intersubjectively valid standards. Such giving form also requires us to stand fast in the midst of temptation. Thus would a Nietzschean dynamical sublime bring us into awareness of our own power of self-restraint.
The Nietzschean tragic could very well be a variation on Kant's dynamical sublime. Instead of the form-dissolving power of nature, we see the form-dissolving power of destructive human activities. Human beings are both the agents of the 12 This analysis raises interesting questions about the role of agent intentions in ethical judgment; though the concept of intentional action would be involved, just as it is in other reflective judgments, the attribution of intention would drop out of ethical judgment, to be replaced by what the judge can't help but feel was the "as if" intention. There are areas of moral judgment, however, where this may not be far from what we do (two possible examples are judgments of culpable negligence and judgments of general character).
